

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRASIL 05666 01 OF 03 211051Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 NSCE-00 ACDA-12 OES-09 MCE-00
IO-13 SS-15 SP-02 EUR-12 EB-08 HA-05 L-03 INR-10
PA-01 /106 W
-----007797 211134Z /16

R 201940Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO USICA WASHDC
INFO JCS WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC 8333

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BRASILIA 5666

USICA

DEPT PASS NSC/PUTNAM, ACDA/ HALSTED

DEPT FOR PM/PALMER

JCS PASS JCS/VAN ALLEN, ISA/THOMPSON

E.O. 11652: GDS
SUBJECT: DISARMAMENT

REF: USICA 15297

BRAZIL DOES NOT REPRESENT A COUNTRY WHERE GLOBAL
DISARMAMENT OR ARMS CONTROL ARE ISSUES OF PRIMARY
CONCERN. GENERALLY, ONE ENCOUNTERS ATTITUDES OF
DISINTEREST SHADING TOWARD MILD ACADEMIC INTEREST TO SOME
DEGREE OF OUTRIGHT PESSIMISM THAT SINCE THESE ARE ISSUES OVER
WHICH THE BRAZILIAN CAN NEVER HOPE TO HAVE ANY INFLUENCE THEY
ARE BEST LEFT TO THE SUPERPOWERS.

I. NEVERTHELESS, A VERY THIN LAYER OF PROFESSIONAL
LEADERSHIP DOES MAINTAIN SOME SEMBLANCE OF CONCERN AND
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRASIL 05666 01 OF 03 211051Z

A MODICUM OF INFORMATION ON THE GENERAL TRENDS IN SUCH
THINGS AS THE SALT TALKS. THIS VERY GROUP, HOWEVER, IN
BRAZIL IS VERY NEARLY INACCESSIBLE TO THE MISSION AND TO
USICA IN PARTICULAR. EVEN WELL-PLACED BRAZILIANS AT
RATHER HIGH LEVELS IN THE POWER STRUCTURE ADMIT THAT
THEY DO NOT KNOW WHO MAKES MANY OF THE KEY DECISIONS.

IN BRAZIL, PUBLICS INTERESTED IN DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE BROADEST DEFINITION CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS A VERY SMALL GOVERNMENT, MILITARY, EDUCATIONAL, PROFESSIONAL AND UPPER-LEVEL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ELITE. THIS ELITE IS POTENTIALLY RATHER THAN EFFECTIVELY CONCERNED WITH THESE ISSUES WHICH ARE SEEN AS THE DOMAIN OF THE GREAT POWERS PLUS THE U.N. AND NATO.

THE POST IS FRANKLY UNWILLING TO TRY TO SPECIFY THE EXACT INSTITUTIONS AND THE NUMBERS THEREIN DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE SUBJECT IS NOT AN ACTIVE ONE HERE.

II. THE POST IS EQUALLY UNABLE TO ASSESS WITH ANY ACCURACY THOSE SPECIFIC ISSUES THAT MIGHT IN FACT BE OF INTEREST TO THE ELITE MENTIONED ABOVE. THE ONLY SOLID CLUES THAT HAVE BECOME AVAILABLE DURING THE PREPARATION OF THIS MESSAGE ARE THE WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF UNIVERSITY AND SOME PUBLIC RELATIONS ELEMENTS IN THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT TO "DISCUSS POSSIBILITIES" FOR DIALOG ON THE OVERALL SUBJECT.

III. BASED ON SAMPLINGS THROUGHOUT THE MISSION WITH SPECIFIC INPUT FROM THE OFFICE OF THE DAO, AND SOME CAREFUL CONTRACT WITH TRUSTED BRAZILIANS, THE FOLLOWING IMPRESSIONISTIC RATINGS OF INTEREST IN THE LIST PROVIDED ARE TENTATIVELY PUT FORTH:
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BRASIL 05666 01 OF 03 211051Z

A. SALT II AND III - MEDIUM

B. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY - HIGH

C. THREATEN NUCLEAR OR "GRAY AREA" ISSUES - VERY LOW
(NOT REALLY KNOWN)

D. RADIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS - VERY LOW

E. ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS - VERY LOW

F. REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS - VERY LOW

G. CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS - HIGH

H. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION - VERY HIGH

I. INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT MACHINERY - LOW

J. DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT - VERY LOW

K. OTHER ISSUES - VERY LOW

IV. THE FOLLOWING ARE VERY IMPRESSIONISTIC RESPONSES
ARE BASED ON DISCUSSIONS WITH ABOVE-AVERAGE CONCERNED
BRAZILIANS.

A. THE UNITED STATES IS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN
ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. AGREE
WITH RESERVATIONS.

B. THE SOVIET UNION IS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN
ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL AND

/
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BRASIL 05666 01 OF 03 211051Z

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRASIL 05666 02 OF 03 211046Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 NSCE-00 ACDA-12 OES-09 MCE-00
IO-13 SS-15 SP-02 EUR-12 EB-08 HA-05 L-03 INR-10
PA-01 /106 W

-----007704 211127Z /16

R 201940Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO USICA WASHDC
INFO JCS WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC 8334

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 BRASILIA 5666

USICA

DEPT PASS NSC/PUTNAM, ACDA/ HALSTED

DEPT FOR PM/PALMER

JCS PASS JSC/VAN ALLEN, ISA/THOMPSON

DISARMAMENT. STRONGLY DISAGREE.

C. THE UNITED STATES HAS MORE ARMAMENTS THAN ARE NECESSARY TO MEET ITS LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS. THOSE WHO KNOW THE ISSUES, DISAGREE AND DOUBT THAT WE ARE A SAFE UMBRELLA ANYMORE. AMONG LESS WELL INFORMED, AGREE, THAT OVERKILL ATOMIC ARSENAL EXISTS.

D. THE SOVIET UNION HAS MORE ARMAMENTS THAN ARE NECESSARY TO MEET ITS LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS. AGREE.

E. THE HOST COUNTRY HAS MORE ARMAMENTS THAN ARE NECESSARY TO MEET ITS LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS. SUBJECT IS TABOO (ESPECIALLY IN BINATIONAL PROGRAMS) BUT OPINION IS: STRONGLY DISAGREE.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRASIL 05666 02 OF 03 211046Z

F. THE UNITED STATES IS MILITARILY SUPERIOR TO THE SOVIET UNION. EQUALLY DIVIDED.

G. THE SOVIET UNION IS MILITARILY SUPERIOR TO THE UNITED STATES. EQUALLY DIVIDED.

H. THE U.S. IS LIKELY TO SACRIFICE THE INTERESTS OF ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES AS IT PUSHES FOR A SALT II AGREEMENT. STRONGLY AGREE.

I. COMPLETION OF SALT II AGREEMENT IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR ALL COUNTRIES. AGREE WITH RESERVATIONS.

J. COMPLETION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR ALL COUNTRIES. AGREE WITH RESERVATIONS.

K. THE ENCHANCED RADIATION (NEUTRON) WARHEAD (BOMB) SHOULD BE PROHIBITED. CIVILIANS STRONGLY AGREE. MILITARY STRONGLY DISAGREE.

L. U.S. POLICIES ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS ARE WELL-INTENTIONED AND CONSTRUCTIVE. DISAGREE. BRAZILIANS FEEL THAT THE U.S. SOMETIMES SELLS ARMS TO BOTH SIDES IN LIMITED CONFLICTS, WHICH PROVE PURELY COMMERCIAL INTERESTS. THIS MAY BE PARTLY A RATIONALIZATION TO JUSTIFY BRAZILIAN SALES.

M U.S. POLICIES ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ARE WELL-INTENTIONED AND CONSTRUCTIVE. EQUALLY DIVIDED WITH A STRONG VIEW THAT U.S. POLICIES ARE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BRASIL 05666 02 OF 03 211046Z

N. REGIONAL AGREEMENTS TO LIMIT CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS ARE AN IMPRACTICAL OBJECTIVE. NO SWEEPING ANSWER POSSIBLE. DEPENDS ON A CASE-BY-CASE STUDY.

O. THE HOST COUNTRY (BRAZIL) SHOULD EXERCISE GREATER RESTRAINT IN INTERNATIONAL SALES OR PURCHASES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS. STRONGLY DISAGREE. THIS SUBJECT IS TABOO (ESPECIALLY IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS). THE WORD "GREATER" IS OFFENSIVE TO BRAZILIANS, BECAUSE IT IMPLIES AN ACCUSATION.

P. ARMS SUPPLIERS SHOULD NOT TRANSFER ARMS TO COUNTRIES GUILTY OF GROSS AND CONSISTENT VIOLATIONS OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS. STRONGLY DISAGREE. IT IS BELIEVED THAT ARMS SUPPLIERS ARE OFTEN THE WORST OFFENDERS.

Q. THE U.S. HAS HAD A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO THE MBFR (MUTUAL BALANCED FORCES REDUCTION) NEGOTIATIONS. RANKING MILITARY EQUALLY DIVIDED BUT MOST HAVE INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION.

R. THE SOVIET UNION HAS HAD A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. RANKING MILITARY EQUALLY DIVIDED BUT MOST HAVE INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION.

S. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON ARMS RESTRAINT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION.

T. NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES CAN CONTRIBUTE IMPORTANTLY TO WORLD PEACE. STRONGLY AGREE, AND THEY SHOULD BE EXTENDED (BY REDUCING THE ZONES WHERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NOW DEPLOYED).

U. U.S. POLICIES ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION STEM
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BRASIL 05666 02 OF 03 211046Z

PRIMARILY FROM ITS DESIRE TO RETAIN ITS DOMINANT POSITION IN THE NUCLEAR FUEL MARKET. STRONGLY AGREE. IT IS THOUGHT THAT U.S. BEHAVIOR CONFIRMS THIS. SOME ALSO FEEL THAT U.S. POLICY IS PROVINCIAL AND SIMPLISTIC.

V. THE HOST COUNTRY SHOULD EXERCISE GREATER CAUTION
IN DEVELOPING PLUTONIUM OR NUCLEAR REPROCESSING
CAPABILITIES. AGREE THAT BRAZIL SHOULD NOT DEVELOP
WEAPONS BUT STRONGLY DISAGREE ON NUCLEAR REPROCESSING.
AGAIN A TABOO SUBJECT, AND AGAIN THE WORD "GREATER"
/

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRASIL 05666 03 OF 03 211042Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 NSCE-00 ACDA-12 OES-09 MCE-00
IO-13 SS-15 SP-02 EUR-12 EB-08 HA-05 L-03 PA-01
INR-10 /106 W
-----007547 211126Z /10

R 201940Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO USICA WASHDC
INFO :JCS WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC 8335

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 BRASILIA 5666

USICA

DEPT PASS NSC/PUTNAM, ACDA/HALSTED

DEPT FOR PM/PALMER

JCS PASS JSC/VAN ALLEN, ISA/THOMPSON

IMPLIES AN ACCUSATION UNACCEPTABLE TO MANY BRAZILIANS.

W. THE HOST COUNTRY (BRAZIL) SHOULD TAKE A MORE
ACTIVE ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS. EQUALLY DIVIDED, BUT IT
WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PROVE A GOOD CASE FOR THIS ROLE
ON THE PART OF BRAZIL.

X. THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT UNEXPLOITED OPPORTUNITIES
FOR REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN THE REGION OF THE HOST
COUNTRY. DISAGREE. BRAZIL AND LATIN AMERICA ARE
SMALL CONSUMERS AND U.S. EMPHASIS IS CONSIDERED
EXAGGERATED.

Y. THE CURRENT DISARMAMENT MACHINERY (E.G. U.N.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRASIL 05666 03 OF 03 211042Z

BODIES, CCD) NEEDS RADICAL RESTRUCTURING. INSUFFICIENT
INFORMATION. ANSWER POSSIBLE ONLY ON THE BASIS OF
DETAILED STUDY OF THESE MACHINERIES AND BODIES, AND OF
THEIR FUNCTIONS AND RESULTS.

V. NO STUDIES ON THESE SUBJECTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE
KNOWLEDGE OF THE POST.

VI. THE SUBJECT WAS DISCUSSED AT THE COUNTRY TEAM
MEETING ON JULY 13, THE MESSAGE WAS DISTRIBUTED TO
ALL SENIOR MISSION OFFICERS, INPUT WAS SOLICITED FROM
ALL SECTIONS AND THE USICA INFLUENCE STRUCTURE STAFF
(ONE AMERICAN AND ONE SENIOR BRAZILIAN) SPENT VIRTUALLY
FULL TIME ON IT OVER THE PAST WEEK. IN ADDITION, THE
PRESS ATTACHE AND THE ACTING CPAO MET INFORMALLY WITH
LEADING BRAZILIAN COLUMNISTS WHO WERE OPEN AND
FORTHRIGHT IN THEIR OPINIONS. THE ACPAO ALSO DISCUSSED
THE GENERAL TOPIC WITH THE PRESS SPOKESMAN FOR THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY, THE PRESIDENT OF THE ALUMNI
ASSOCIATION OF THE SUPREME WAR COLLEGE OF BRAZIL IN
BRASILIA AND OTHER LEADING BRAZILIAN CONTACTS. SENIOR
PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICERS IN BRAZILIAN MINISTRIES
WERE CONTRACTED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW PROGRAMMING
STRESS OF THE AGENCY. IN ALL CASES THE STATEMENT OF THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SUMMED UP THE TONE OF THE
RESPONSES. HE SAID, "THIS IS LIKE OUTER SPACE TO US.
WE DON'T KNOW MUCH ABOUT IT AND DO NOT CONSIDER IT AN
IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR DEBATE." THE POST WOULD RATE THE
RELIABILITY OF ITS DATA AT BEST AS QUESTIONABLE. THAT
THE INFORMED PUBLIC OPINION ON EACH QUESTION AS PRESENTED
WOULD ACCORD 100 PERCENT WITH THE QUESTIMATES GIVEN IS UNPROVABLE.
IT IS UNDENIABLE THAT BRAZILIAN PERCEPTIONS, ESPECIALLY
ON NON-PROLIFERATION ARE SHIFTING. THIS SHOULD NOT BE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BRASIL 05666 03 OF 03 211042Z

TAKEN TO IMPLY THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN MARCH 1979
WILL SUBSTANTIALLY ALTER THE PRESENT POLICY STANCE.
MANY, HOWEVER, STRONGLY FEEL THAT FURTHER EDUCATION OF
BRAZILIANS IS A BRAZILIAN INTERNAL MATTER AND NOT ONE
FOR FOREIGN INITIATIVE.

VII. THE POST STRONGLY DOUBTS THE ADVISABILITY OF
MOUNTING ANY KIND OF NEW AND FORCEFUL CAMPAIGN IN

BRAZIL ON THESE ISSUES. THE ONLY ONES THAT HAVE ANY RESONANCE HERE ARE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE SINGLE MOST DELICATE ISSUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL AT PRESENT--THE NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NON-PROLIFERATION QUESTION. TO PUSH THE U.S. CONTENTION THAT OUR DOUBTS ABOUT THE BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM ARE AT HEART DISARMAMENT-BASED WILL FLY DIRECTLY INTO THE EMOTIONAL AND STRONGLY HELD CONVICTION OF BRAZILIANS THAT THAT ARGUMENT IS ONLY A SMOKE SCREEN. SECONDLY, THERE IS SOME CONSIDERABLE FEELING AMONG INFORMED BRAZILIANS THAT THE U.S. IS WEAK AND IS CAVING IN TO RUSSIAN PRESSURES ON MAY ISSUES AT PRESENT. TO IMPEL DISARMAMENT ONTO THE STAGE WILL BE TO INVITE MORE OPEN DEBATE ON ONE OF THE ISSUES WHEN EVEN STATESIDE OPINION IS OPENLY DIVIDED AND COULD LEAD TO OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER DENIGRATION OF AMERICAN WILLPOWER. THE POST WILL, OF COURSE, WELCOME MORE FULL TEXTS, AND BACKGROUND ARTICLES ON THESE SUBJECTS. IT WILL CONTINUE TO PUT THESE ITEMS INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE LIMITED FEW WHO WANT AND NEED SUCH INFORMATION. GOOD, OBJECTIVE TITLES FOR THE BOOK TRANSLATION PROGRAM ARE ALWAYS WELCOMED, TOO.

CROSS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DISARMAMENT, POLICIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978BRASIL05666
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780300-0210
Format: TEL
From: BRASILIA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780740/aaaabhfy.tel
Line Count: 408
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 1d6b3570-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION PM
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14 jul 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1947944
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DISARMAMENT
TAGS: PARM, BR
To: ICA JCS MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/1d6b3570-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014